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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and its role in the Cold War. Great detail highlights the timeliness of the CIA’s creation 
and dynamic role over the years that followed its founding. For half a century, attempts to 
understand the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dominated the CIA’s agenda. Thus, 
careful study of this era is important to understanding the progression of intelligence 
within the United States. The avenue of research for this thesis was a collaboration of 
published books, online journals, credible websites, and personal interviews. The 
development of the CIA consisted of much trial and error. Despite the blunders that the 
agency made, the CIA’s achievements would make its existence significantly worthwhile.  
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Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency  
 
and its Vital Role in the Cold War Era 
 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generates thoughts of secret agents, 
classified documents, and mysterious dealings in foreign affairs. In order to understand 
the CIA’s function today, it is important to know the reason behind its founding. Alfred 
McCormack, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, offered special insight 
with his observation about the need to study global interactions. McCormack stated, “The 
first objective … is to know and understand the other countries and peoples of the world 
well enough to live with them in peace- to shape our policy, as it affects other peoples, 
towards the aim of peace. The second objective is to be prepared for war if it occurs.”1 To 
carry out such a vision, the creation of an organization such as the CIA became crucial 
during the beginning of the Cold War. The development of the CIA unified the 
intelligence community and became a major guide for U.S. policy makers during the 
complexities of the Cold War Era.  
The onset of the Cold War ushered in a new phase for the United States and 
former Soviet Union. For almost half a century, the two superpowers competed for 
superiority. It was a suspenseful period between the two states, each fearing the other 
would use their military capabilities. The United States created the CIA at the beginning 
of the Cold War to gather and analyze intelligence on foreign governments. In addition to 
carrying out operations to combat communism in other nations, the CIA played a major 
role in devising the intentions, capabilities, and overall status of the Soviet Union. The 
                                                 
1. Edward T. Folliard, “Intelligence Agency Created by Truman: Information for 'Security' Is 
Goal; State, War, and Navy to Be Represented,” The Washington Post (1877-1954), January 23, 
1946, http://www.proquest.com, (accessed February 23, 2008).  
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CIA was a crucial component in the Intelligence Community in helping prevent the Cold 
War from becoming an active nuclear war. 
The CIA carried out collection, analysis, and operations as its primary functions. 
These methods were determined by the intelligence requirements that were decided by 
the executive authorities and communicated to the agency. There was one position 
Congress made clear when drafting legislation for the agency’s creation: the agency 
would not enforce law or manipulate policy. Its role would be to aid the policy maker in 
foreign affairs by providing objective intelligence analysis.2 
There was a crucial need for the development of the CIA. The agency offered a 
center point in which to filter the mass amount of information transmitted within the 
Intelligence Community (IC). World War II was over and America had begun to exercise 
its new role as a superpower. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) served in helping 
the United States gather intelligence and carry out “special services” during the war.3 
Other intelligence agencies participated in the scramble to collect and analyze 
intelligence information. Although the State, Navy, and War departments all worked in 
the same building, they often worked independently of each other. However, with so 
many agencies gathering information compartmentally, it was difficult to present clear, 
efficient, and frequent updates to the president. Another problem was that there did not 
exist a designated person to report to the president, accept for the occasional Foreign 
                                                 
 2. “The National Security Act of 1947,”http://www.texascollaborative.org/SilverblattModule/act2-
1.php, (accessed March 28, 2010).  
 
3. Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2006), 31 
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Service officer.4 The nation lacked a united intelligent system and needed to organize the 
various departments and agencies via a central agency in order to achieve this. 
Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan was the head of the Central Office of 
Information (COI), later renamed the OSS, and was a major proponent for the creation of 
the CIA. During October 1944, Donovan prepared for President Franklin Roosevelt a 
memorandum that outlined reasons why a central organization was necessary in the post 
war era and its function in the Intelligence Community (IC).5 This plan explained the 
CIA’s role as the central leader in acquiring and analyzing intelligence. This meant the 
agency would filter through collected data and compile a daily update to the president 
concerning important information vital to the nation’s interest. Furthermore, Donovan 
suggested that this core intelligence service should receive its designated operations from 
the president rather than the military.6 As a result, the CIA would function as a direct 
operational agency to the president. 
In a February 1945 article published in The Chicago Daily Tribune, Walter 
Trohan described and analyzed Donovan’s proposal. He described Donovan’s proposed 
agency as “the general intelligence service, which would outrank all existing federal 
police and intelligence units, including military intelligence, naval intelligence, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue [Service] 
                                                 
4. David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
1943-1947 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas), 6. 
 
5. Ibid, 34; Walter Trohan, “New Deal Plans Super Spy System: Sleuths Would Snoop on U.S. 
and the World,” Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1963), February 9 1945, http://www.proquest.com/, 
(accessed February 22, 2008), 1-2.  
 
 6. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 34. 
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agents, and the Federal Communications Commission.”7 President Roosevelt supported 
the existence of such an agency, and finally on April 5, 1945 called for a consensus of 
opinion among the Chief Executive agencies of foreign intelligence and internal security, 
concerning such an agency. However, before any action could take place, Roosevelt 
passed away. 
With the sudden death of President Roosevelt, Vice President Harry S. Truman 
took the oath of office on April 12, 1945. President Truman followed through with the 
vision of a central intelligence agency and turned it into a reality. Truman recognized the 
Soviet threat on America’s freedom and security more than Roosevelt.8 Consequently, 
Truman sought to improve U.S. intelligence and prepare America for the upcoming 
struggle with the Soviet Union.  
During his administration, Truman was fully aware of the power struggle between 
the FBI, OSS, Military Intelligence, and the State Department.9 However, he was careful 
to not act hastily in creating the organization for fear of causing destructive competition 
amongst the agencies. He also did not want to form an agency that could later be 
corrupted and used for unintended purposes.10 On January 22, 1946, Truman ordered the 
formation of a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) that would supervise intelligence 
organizations. It would consist of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and a personal 
representative of the president. Admiral William Leahy was the first appointee. Next, he 
took steps to create the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G.). Admiral Souers was the first 
                                                 
 7. Trohan, New Deal Plans, 1. 
 
8. Dr. Charles Murphy, interview by author, Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA, April 8, 2008.  
 
9. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 35. 
 
10. Ibid., 35. 
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to fill the role as head of the agency, but resigned six months later. However, he did assist 
General Hoyt Vandenberg in becoming his successor as the head of the CIG.11 
In 1947 Truman encouraged enactment of the National Security Act, which 
created the Central Intelligence Agency. The act put the CIA under the authority of the 
newly created National Security Council. The Lovett Committee, led by Robert A. 
Lovett, played an important role in suggesting the concept that the CIA should have an 
independent budget and be held responsible under a National Intelligence Authority.12 
Congress approved NSC to fulfill that role, and its members consist of the president, 
secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and other major presidential advisors on 
foreign affairs.13 The purpose of placing the NSC over the CIA was to regulate the 
agency, and ensure that it functioned as it was designed. The law stated that there would 
be limits on the CIA such “that the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powers, or internal security functions.”14 The CIA is the only agency, by 
law, put under the NSC whose main function is to advise the president.  
The Director of the CIA given an important role in overseeing the agency and 
reporting personally to the president; the president named the director and then the Senate 
had to confirm that individual. This same process takes place in appointing the deputy 
director of the CIA as well. Traditionally, the president appointed both a civilian and a 
military representative for the two positions. By law, both posts could be filled by 
civilians, but legislation prevented both appointees from being associated with the 
                                                 
11. Ibid., 36. 
 
12. Ibid. 
 
13. Ibid., 36-37. 
 
14. Ibid., 259. 
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military.15 Congress put this restriction on the CIA to prevent it from being dominated by 
military interests. After fifteen years, there were a total of four Directors. These four in 
consecutive order include Rear Admiral Roscue Henry Hillenkoetter, General Walter 
Bedell Smith, General Allen Dulles, and John A. McCone.  
The CIA has to get approval from the president for every operation prior to 
carrying it out (except those done by regular routine). That includes both overt and covert 
(secret and non-secret) operations.16 First, the CIA gets its approval from the NSC and 
then its plans are sent to the president for final approval. However, the president can 
override or bypass the NSC. 17 Allen Dulles, (the third Director of the CIA) describes the 
CIA as a servant of policy, not the maker of policy.18 Such regulation of the CIA should 
lower any public fear of the CIA becoming an autonomous agency powered by internal 
self interests. This was an important fact that helped decrease public skeptism of the new 
government agency. 
The CIA’s creation brought various improvements to the system of intelligence 
and strengthened security for America. Although the CIA had similarities to the OSS, the 
new agency was not completely modeled after its predecessor. The CIA borrowed 
intelligence techniques from foreign intelligent agencies, including Great Britain and 
Israel.19 In fact, only a few years after the CIA was established, it was holding regular 
                                                 
 
15. Ibid. 
 
  16. Murphy, interview; Dr. Stephen Bowers, interview by author, Liberty University, Lynchburg, 
VA, April 8, 2008; Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 258. 
  
17. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 258. 
 
18. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 258-259. 
 
19. Murphy interview. 
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cooperative meetings with British intelligence.20 They took place both in Washington 
D.C. and in London. Such positive relations with British intelligence provided the CIA 
with opportunities to monitor foreign broadcasts, and build up an arrangement of spies in 
other countries. This relationship with the British later benefited the United States during 
the Cold War. For instance, during the late 1940s, British intelligence was willing to 
share with the CIA information concerning the Soviet Union and the situation in 
Europe.21  As a result, America had assistance in its attempt to provide security for its 
homeland against any possible Soviet threats.  
As soon as the CIA was able to function, the agency wasted no time in performing 
its duties. Early on, the Director of the CIA was corresponding directly to the president 
on important issues. In the mid 1940s, a CIA team began putting together information 
gathered from the whole intelligence community, in order to make more efficient 
estimates on a range of issues. This group was first called the Office of Research and 
Estimates (ORE), and later renamed the Board of National Estimates (BNE). In 
September 1947, the CIA began to submit monthly assessments of the world’s status to 
the NSC.22 Thus, the CIA was on its way to improving the dissemination of intelligence 
information, in order to provide deeper insights to the American foreign policy makers.  
An important way that the CIA collected data was through covert operations. 
These types of operations were significant because it gave the agency a means to gather 
information that otherwise may have been unavailable. Later, Dr. William Langer 
                                                                                                                         
 
20. Ibid. 
 
21. Trevor Barnes, “The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 
1946-1956. Part I,” The Historical Journal, no. 2. (Jun., 1981): 401, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-
246X%28198106%2924%3A2%3C399%3ATSCWTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U, (accessed February 23, 2008). 
 
22. Ibid., 400. 
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petitioned in favor of the CIA receiving funds to conduct covert operations at an NIA 
meeting.23 By February 1947, the CIA Director General Vandenberg reported to the 
president that clandestine operations were strategically being formed in foreign nations. 
However, in order to get official authority on covert action, the director testified 
privately, in April 1947, to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Suspicion of the 
Soviets was building rapidly at the time, and secret missions were one way to attain 
information on the adversary without attracting too much attention on attempts to contain 
communism in Europe.24 
Eventually the CIA realized that its internal structure, pertaining to its various 
departments, was too compartmentalized and restricted the effectiveness of the agency’s 
mission. Each division acted as its own entity and thus lacked efficient information 
sharing methods. To fix the problem, all the departments were moved into the same 
building. This meant that issues dealing with espionage, counter espionage, and 
psychological warfare were addressed through information sharing, and thus handled 
with greater understanding between the various sections of the agency. Furthermore, 
Allen Dulles describes a unique aspect of the CIA. The agency analyzes and organizes 
data from clandestine operations with the same importance that it would concerning 
information from other government agencies.25 In other words, the CIA weighed 
information gathered from other agencies as equally important to information that it 
                                                 
23. Ibid., 405. 
 
24. Ibid. 
 
25. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 37. 
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collected.  This leveled the field of intelligence information, thus making the various 
sources equally viable.  
In the early years of the Cold War, the CIA used different tactics to collect, 
analyze, and respond to information concerning conflict with the USSR. The CIA hired 
local USSR residents to observe the Soviet forces and inform the United States of any 
sudden activity.26 By using local Soviet citizens for this task, as opposed to U.S. spies 
disguising as tourists, the CIA is more likely to spy on the Soviets without raising any 
suspicion. Another tactic the CIA implemented over time was conducting U2 flights over 
Soviet bases and other areas of importance, for the purpose of taking ground photos of 
the enemy territory. As technology increased, the CIA used methods such as phone 
tapping, and intercepting broadcasting systems. Furthermore, open source intelligence 
was important as well when investigating an issue. These unclassified documents 
included newspapers, scientific publications, journals, pamphlets and any other 
information that was available to the public. 
With the creation of the CIA arose more opportunities for professional careers in 
intelligence. During the end of World War II, the CIA trained thousands of intelligence 
personnel to serve the nation temporarily. Civilians, including teachers and professionals 
in specific fields, were hired to serve as officers in intelligence. The military also had a 
sector that specialized in intelligence related work. To some it was viewed as “a 
graveyard assignment,” that would last only temporarily. 27 However, the CIA changed 
the status of intelligence employment, by providing opportunities for select individuals to 
                                                 
 26. Bowers, interview. 
 
27. Ibid., 167. 
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pursue a selection of careers. Of course this opened up the need to provide intelligence 
staff with the same benefits as the Foreign Service, in which the military offered. This 
included the expectation that CIA employers would remain for long durations with the 
agency. Committed employees brought two major benefits to the field of intelligence. 
The first was that the agency was able to sustain knowledgeable and experienced officers 
through both times of war and peace. Secondly, a large turnover was costly and risky to 
the agency. Short-term personnel were a disadvantage to the agency because of the 
expense in screening, hiring, and training employees. Also, if there was a large turnover 
of CIA officers, there was a greater risk of classified information leaking out to the 
enemy.28  
Another interesting aspect of intelligence professionals in the CIA was 
(and continues to be) their discouragement from participating in political matters, 
except when directed to do so by the agency’s authorities. This includes every 
person in the agency from the Director of the CIA on down to the new hire. To 
enforce the importance of this, the agency established a rule outlining these 
conditions and violation of it results in termination of employment with the 
agency.29 Prohibition of meddling in political matters is a reasonable policy since 
involvement in politics creates bias, and could interfere with the CIA’s role when 
handling certain information. However, CIA workers are permitted to maintain 
their freedom in voting during elections. 
Since the agency’s founding, the CIA’s capabilities and application of its 
intelligence has fluctuated with the different presidents, each with their own special 
                                                 
28. Ibid., 167-168. 
 
29. Ibid., 264. 
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interests and views on the Cold War. Some presidents relied heavily on the CIA to 
provide intelligence on foreign affairs, and others were more suspicious of the agency. 
This was partially due to the amount of espionage that occurred between the Soviets and 
the Americans. Spies were a constant threat in intelligence agencies, since this was the 
primary way to find out the intentions of the enemy. When double agents were 
discovered infiltrating the CIA, the agency’s credentials and reliability was questioned.30  
When referencing the CIA’s adversary, the former Soviet Union, it is important to 
understand there were two main intelligence groups that supported the communist 
empire. The first was the NKVD, called the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti 
(Committee of State Security), and also known as the KGB. This group was the Soviet 
government’s security agency, and their roles ranged from suppressing internal resistance 
within the USSR, to infiltrating the U.S. government.31 The other was Glavnoye 
Razvedovatel'noye Upravlenie (the Main Intelligence Administration), called GRU for 
short. The GRU primarily handled the Soviet’s foreign intelligence. The CIA battled with 
Soviet intelligence, seeking to know the other agencies’ secrets.  This led to the perpetual 
employment of spies by the two countries. 
 The KGB eliminated many of its agents that were accused of espionage, whether 
or not they were involved with criminal behavior against their nation. The CIA would 
have its own process of dealing with spies, but not at the same severity and paranoia as 
the KGB. Although each nation had its own intelligence capabilities, it was not unusual 
for each to misunderstand, or make assumptions about the other’s capabilities and 
intentions. For example, a NATO war exercise, called Able Archer, brought the two 
                                                 
30 Bowers, interview. 
 
31.  KGB, http://library.thinkquest.org/10826/kgb.htm, (accessed February 8, 2010), 1. 
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nations to the brink of an actual nuclear war. This happened when the Soviet Union 
mistook the simulation for an actual attack.  The Soviet Union’s fears subsided when they 
realized it was a false alarm, since troops were not actually being mobilized on the 
ground.32 This is just one example of how the tensions of the Cold War made each highly 
skeptical of the other superpower. 
Over the years of the Cold War, many agencies arose to meet the demanding 
needs for intelligence worldwide. In the United States alone, there existed over a dozen 
agencies, both civilian and military. For example, the Defensive Intelligence Agency was 
created in the 1960s and consisted of military and civilian personnel. However, the CIA 
would have the prominent role in the Intelligence Community. The agency would have 
the immense responsibility of combining the intelligence gathered from other agencies, as 
well as its own, and producing the President’s Daily Brief and long term intelligence that 
informed presidents on specific international affairs.33 With a larger intelligence 
community, the CIA had more resources in which to gather intelligence from. 
At the time of the CIA’s beginnings, the War Department handled the majority of 
Soviet Analysis. However, on March 5, 1948, General Lucius D. Clay sent a “War 
Warning” through a cable to inform Washington of Soviet capabilities.34 The CIA 
believed the USSR was unwilling (and unlikely) to provoke a war with the United States, 
whereas the military dramatized the Soviet military buildup and programs. It is possible 
that the U.S. Army may have used this situation as an opportunity to increase their 
                                                 
 32. Bowers, interviews. 
 
33. Gerald Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds, Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the 
Soviet Union, (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2001), ix. 
 
34. Ibid., ix. 
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defense budget. Nevertheless, Clay’s warning was the turning point for the CIA. The 
agency’s mission broadened to include research on a variety of topics such as economics, 
transportation, geography, etc. Since the State Department (DOS) and the military had a 
percepted monopoly on political and military analysis, the CIA focused more on 
scientific and economic analysis of the USSR early on. However, the CIA took on more 
responsibilities as time progressed. In the early 1950s, the DOS allowed the CIA to 
manage analysis and economic investigations of the Soviet Union and its East European 
neighbors. This opened the door for the CIA to conduct analysis of specific areas and 
broaden their understanding of the Soviet Bloc in a variety of issues.  
  The CIA’s role eventually developed to include studies on the intentions, 
capabilities, and overall status of the Soviet Union. More specifically, areas of focus 
included the Soviet’s economical, political, military, scientific, and technological 
advancements. The CIA was particularly skilled at observing and analyzing the Soviet 
economy, which essentially impacted the other spheres of the Soviet Union. Max 
Millikan stated, “The agency’s economic analysis contributed to a better understanding of 
the threat posed by the Soviets in both economic and military spheres, and restrained a 
general tendency to exaggerate that threat.”35   
The CIA took on the primary role of analyzing Soviet technological advances in 
relation to its economy and military. For instance, the agency concluded that the Soviet’s 
poor planning and management attributed to a slower progression in technology. 
Furthermore, the agency noticed that the Soviets were investing more than they were 
                                                 
35. Ibid., x. 
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importing, thus adding to a weaker economy.36The CIA even held its own Economic 
Division, which gained attention over the decades.37 It became the best known analysis in 
the West on the Soviet Union. Even some top Soviet officials depended on the CIA’s 
records in understanding their own economic situation, since many of their own sources 
were so unreliable. The CIA produced the JEC papers, in which 40% were reviewed by 
the Soviet’s.38 However, the CIA was not always 100% accurate. For instance, its 1977 
estimates of oil reservation in the USSR were too low.39  In 1982, the agency claimed that 
Soviet defense spending was growing 4-5% per year, when in reality it had been slowing 
down since 1975. 
 During the Cold War, the United States competed with the USSR in its 
technological advances. The CIA was innovative in its collection capabilities and 
analytical techniques. Some of these included integrating Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) 
with its collection.40 The United States developed the U-2 High Altitude Reconnaissance 
Aircraft, and speed-based imaging satellites, which were indispensable to U.S. 
intelligence.41 This allowed for earlier detection of Soviet Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), and revealed the truth about the missile gap theory. Other programs arose in the 
United States with technological advancements including the Oxcart Program, and the 
Corona Satellite Imagery. These programs produced high flying spy planes with 
                                                 
36. Ibid., xi. 
 
37. Ibid. 
 
38. Ibid., 25. 
 
39. Ibid., xiii. 
 
40. Ibid., xvii. 
 
41. Ibid., xviii. 
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photographic capabilities. As a result, expansive areas were documented to visually 
assess Soviet territory and weapons. 
  The Soviet’s political realm was of particular interest to the CIA, because the 
Soviet’s communist policy drove the USSR. It was also in direct opposition to America’s 
ideology and system of government, and thus the CIA paid close attention to Soviet 
policy. The CIA had been observing Soviet politics as early as 1946, when it was 
formerly known as the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). This continued throughout the 
Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, post Brezhnev, and finally the Gorbachev time of power.42 
The CIA asked experts to pay close attention to their specialized areas of study, and 
encouraged them to avoid bias in their conclusions. Despite this, critics claim that the 
agency was too cautious and conservative when evaluating Soviet foreign policy issues.43 
In the view of Douglas F. Garthoff, a formal analyst and senior CIA official, the agency 
was more focused on the military threats of the USSR instead of looking for opportunities 
to improve U.S. interests in foreign policy.  
 Although the CIA may have overemphasized the Soviet’s military capabilities, it 
was not always easy to interpret the Soviet’s intentions. In the 1950s and 1960s, rumors 
were spread of a bomber gap theory, or missile gap theory between the USSR and the 
United States, claiming the Soviet’s had the advantage in missile technology.44 By 1958, 
the United States was operating U-2 flights and America’s technological intelligence 
negated the bomber gap theory. The missile gap theory was uncovered in 1961 by 
                                                 
42. Haines and Leggett, Watching the Bear, xiii. 
 
43. Ibid., xiv. 
 
44. Ibid., xviii-xix. 
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Satellite Photography, which revealed the U.S. Air Force had overestimated the number 
of Soviet military weapons.  
 However, there was still concern that the Soviet nuclear capabilities were either 
equal, or superior to the United States. Sometimes the lack of CIA Human Intelligence in 
the USSR made it difficult for U.S. officials to know what the Soviet’s were thinking. A 
bilateral fear between the two nations escalated in 1983 when the North Atlantic Treaty 
organization (NATO) conducted an exercise called Able Archer, a nuclear missile 
assimilation on the Soviet Union. The Soviets mistook the war game for a real attack and 
prepared for a counter attack strike. Communications indicated that NATO had released 
the missile, but in reality this was not taking place. Thankfully, the Soviet’s realized that 
it was a false alarm, and withdrew their standby position without releasing a nuclear 
missile. The 1980s were distinguished with fear of Moscow’s growing military power. 
However, the tension was greatly reduced when the Soviet’s leader Yuri Andropov died 
on February 9, 1984. As a result, President Reagan’s fears turned towards a more hopeful 
future between the two nations. During the whole span of the Cold War, the United States 
spent an estimated $2 trillion on its strategic nuclear forces during the Cold War.45 
Fortunately the nuclear weapons were not actually employed in a nuclear battle with the 
Soviet Union, but used instead as a tool to warn the Soviet’s of America’s capabilities 
and deter them from exercising their strength against the United States. 
 During President Richard Nixon’s administration, attempts were made to improve 
the world situation. Reagan called for Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) to begin 
                                                 
45. End of the Cold War, The, 
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to address ways in which to limit the use of nuclear weapons.46 SALT I talks occurred 
between the years 1969 to 1972 and created a temporary nuclear limits agreement 
between the USSR and the United States called the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It was 
followed less than a week later by the Basic Principles of Relations agreement, an 
attempt for peaceful co-existence between the two nations. SALT II created for another 
treaty, but was rejected by the U.S. Senate.47 Reagan was able to make these decisions 
with the assistance of CIA reports. 
 These attempts of peace were overturned by President Ronald Reagan’s arms 
buildup in the 1980s. However, President Reagan did take steps towards peace, even 
though he prepared for the worst. In 1982, President Reagan abandoned SALT and 
instead adopted the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Talks (START) by 1983. It took 
over a decade for major progress to occur with these talks and a treaty was signed on July 
31, 1991 between the United States and USSR. This followed with other treaties that 
would reduce the number of nuclear weapons each contained in their arsenals.48 Through 
each of the president’s administrations, the CIA provided intelligence on current 
situations and future projections of U.S. decisions, as it did for the Reagan 
administration. 
 As the CIA developed over time, the overall Intelligence Community (IC) 
progressed as well. For example, the Office of Soviet Analysis made important 
organizational changes in 1981 when it combined military, political, and economical 
analysts into one room. This created a multi-disciplinary approach to intelligence. Also, 
                                                 
46. CIA, https://www.cia.gov/, (accessed April 15, 2009). 
 
47. Cold War, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1881.html , (accessed February 5, 2010). 
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the IC and CIA began to branch out and partner with private companies in collecting 
information. This was due to the IC’s desire to think outside the box and need to seek out 
nontraditional methods of studying issues and targeting the enemy’s weaknesses. The IC 
looked into technological advances to aid analysts in evaluating high amounts of 
collection. Other ways the IC improved was recruiting more qualified candidates and 
providing improved training for new agents. Hiring employees with traveling experience 
was a plus, especially if the person had lived in another culture for a while. This was 
significant, because possessing agents who were familiar with other countries helped 
prevent mirror imaging, which is the view that another country shares the same values 
and worldview as one’s own country. Finally, professionals were sought out to contribute 
their expertise to the agency. They were found in the business world, the university, the 
military, the government and elsewhere.49 
Director of Intelligence (DI) and leading expert James Noren explained that the 
IC and CIA had success in achieving five main goals. The first was in assessing their 
available resources to understand present and future military threats. The second was 
investigating their resources in order to identify the location and nature of military 
threats. Noel Firth and James Noren commented that without the defense spending 
estimates, “The prevailing view of Soviet military programs would have been more 
alarmist and U.S. defense spending during the Cold War would have been much 
higher.”50 The third goal was observing the Soviet’s economic arena, believing that this 
would reveal the Soviet’s true intentions. The fourth was providing decision makers with 
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suggestions to weaken their enemies’ capabilities, thus decreasing potential threats 
(Counter Intelligence). Finally, the fifth was in contrasting the strengths between the 
eastern and the western powers.51  
On the contrary, the Central Intelligence (CI) experienced some setbacks. For 
example, The National Estimates closed down its board and staff in 1973. It was replaced 
by the National Intelligence Officers, who drafted geographic and subject related 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). This was a disadvantage because the careful 
process in reviewing each estimate was compromised in this exchange. In other words, an 
important structural element was lost, because the new board did not review each national 
estimate, unlike the previous method that did. 
Studying the CIA and its involvement in the Cold War is a tedious endeavor. The 
CIA was not perfect, and was full of intelligence failures. However, each mistake 
educated the agency on how to improve its methods of creating intelligence, and relaying 
it in a timely manner. Perhaps the most difficult role the agency was given was the task of 
understanding the enemy’s precise intentions at specific times during the Cold War. 
Finding out another’s capabilities was a complete contrast from knowing whether the 
enemy would use (and how it would use) its power against the United States. For this 
reason, the CIA strived to be one step ahead of the enemy, yet still found it difficult to 
predict an advisory’s motivations and level of threat.  
Highlighted below are some of the failures and successes the CIA encountered 
during the Cold War era. For instance, the CIA underestimated the time it would take for 
the Soviets to develop the atomic bomb, largely due to the fact that the Soviets stole 
information from the United States during the development of the bomb, known as the 
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Manhattan project. The Soviets did this by recruiting inside members of the project to spy 
and share information with the Soviets. In another instance, the CIA failed to realize the 
Soviets would invade Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, Operation Zapata, code named Bay 
of Pigs was a failure, and so was the assassination attempt of Fidel Castro. Also, although 
the CIA was able to dispel major myths of the Soviet capabilities, it still tended to 
overestimate the Soviet military deployment and arms buildup. Finally, the agency was 
unable to foresee the sudden collapse of the USSR before 1991.52  
On the other hand, the CIA aided U.S. policy makers with intelligence in a variety 
of issues on many nations, including the USSR. Although the CIA did not see that the 
Soviet Union was on the brink of destruction as such a rapid rate, the agency was aware 
that the Soviet economy was in danger of implosion. In other foreign affairs, the CIA 
helped organize operations to fight communism and was successful in Guatemala and 
Iran. Finally, the CIA used reconnaissance to identify the Soviet missiles in Cuba that 
were aimed at the United States, consequently providing President John F. Kennedy with 
timey intelligence to plan a strategic response. Raymond L. Garthoff describes how the 
CIA’s analysis was not always correct, neither was it always accepted, but it was “more 
correct, more often.”53 
The CIA performance was a major asset to the U.S. decision makers in 
understanding its enemy, the USSR. Although the Intelligence Community contained a 
plethora of skill, knowledge and capabilities, the creation of the Central Intelligence 
Agency was paramount. The CIA put a great deal of effort and energy into developing its 
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collection and analytical capabilities to meet its consumer’s demands, thus making it a 
dynamic entity. 54  It was also less influenced by institutional interests than the military 
intelligence services were.55 The overall success of the CIA is recognized in the fact that 
the Cold War tensions never escalated to an actual nuclear war. Thus, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 not only indicated the end of the Cold War, but symbolized a time of 
peaceful celebration after a long fear of a potential nuclear combat between the two 
opposing sides. 
Not only was the CIA influential in the intelligence community, but it had an 
impact on the globe. In many cases, the function and value of the CIA was not 
completely grasped by other nations, let alone U.S. citizens. The CIA gained a 
prestigious reputation for itself because of its efforts against communism around the 
world. The CIA monitored foreign nations, and conducted covert operations when 
necessary to collect needed information. These operations gave the CIA its secret agent 
(spy) stereotype, and launched many ideas for movies and means of entertainment in the 
American culture. Thus, the CIA became known as an agency against the forces of 
communism, but little was known to the average U.S. citizen how the agency actually 
operated and disseminated its intelligence. 
There are various open source intelligence resources that provide access to better 
understand the CIA’s role in the Cold War. Although not all the secrets of the Cold War 
were released, there is enough obtainable data to do an extensive study on the CIA’s 
position of the global conflict. For instance, there are sources such as books written by 
former (or current) CIA agents/ Directors. There exists CIA unclassified reports that can 
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be used to compare primary source documents with secondary information from critics. 
These previously confidential documents provide an inside perspective on how the CIA 
functioned and viewed the nations of the world. Furthermore, there are online credible 
sources such as the CIA’s official website (www.cia.gov), which includes vital 
information in the agency’s history. This is also an important source to seek out in order 
to learn the CIA’s official opinion about issues it was involved in.  Other sources include 
scholarly journals and newspapers that contain the public and media’s opinion on the 
CIA and its operations. Finally, if available, one can conduct personal interviews of 
former intelligence agents/ analysts of the Cold War era and hear first hands accounts of 
the U.S. struggle against the former Soviet Union.  
Understanding the history of the CIA in the field of intelligence requires an 
understanding of the CIA’s influence on the citizens of America, and the agency’s view 
of the world. This attainable information is beneficial for people from all disciplines and 
backgrounds to grasp. Whether it is the policy maker, business professional, current 
intelligence agent, or curious citizen, everyone can benefit from understanding the CIA’s 
involvement in the history of U.S. intelligence.  
Although issues and leaders change throughout time, there will always be a need 
for intelligence in this unstable world. It is vital to America’s national security that the 
past successes and failures of the CIA are not forgotten, or ignored.  The current situation 
of America has been impacted by the CIA’s contributions in the past. Take for instance 
the events of the CIA’s invasion of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs, and the lessons learned from 
that failure. On a brighter note, America enjoyed success in the Cuban Missile Crises 
because of the CIA’s contributions. Despite the outcome, the CIA played a significant 
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role in advising policy makers during the Cold War, and beyond.  The CIA has been the 
eyes and ears of policy makers in major international events affecting the United States in 
the mid to late 20th century.  The Cold War was the platform in which the CIA built its 
foundation and gave the agency the motivation to progress into the capable entity it is 
today. 
According to Alfred McCormack, the CIA has succeeded in its overall vision, in 
knowing the world and being prepared for war if necessary. Although the CIA has its 
blemishes, the agency has succeeded in leading the United States in its important role in 
the world and has accomplished much since its founding. To reiterate the importance of 
the CIA, it literally changed how America viewed the role of intelligence. Furthermore, 
the CIA attempted to unite the fourteen plus intelligence bodies as it cooperated with 
each in carrying out its mission. As a result of the agency’s designation, U.S. Presidents 
and leaders of foreign policy were informed on world affairs better than ever in 
America’s history. Furthermore, the agency created a more influential and attractive 
image for intelligence employees, creating a unique and professional elite in the 
government sector. Yet still, the CIA developed into an important monitor of world 
activities that would prove to be crucial in later years throughout the Cold War. As 
envisioned from the CIA’s beginning, the agency became a prevailing authority that 
greatly impacted the world throughout the mid 20th century, and it continues to do so in 
the present.
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